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NOTES
Extending the Rule of Reason to Pendent
Jurisdiction: Vespa of America Corp. v. Bajaj
Auto Ltd.
Under the principle of comity, courts of a foreign state or jurisdic-
tion will give effect to laws and judicial decisions of another state orjuris-
diction, not as a matter of obligation, but out of deference and mutual
respect.' Where the full faith and credit clause of the U.S. Constitution2
does not apply, the doctrine of comity must be implemented to ensure
that decisions in one country are effective and enforceable in another.3
This doctrine has come to play a major role in determining the existence
of U.S. jurisdiction in transnational cases, 4 particularly in the interna-
tionally sensitive areas5 of antitrust and business regulation. 6
In Vespa of America Corp. v. Bajy Auto Lid., 7 an Italian corporation
and its U.S. distributor brought suit in the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of California against an Indian corporation and its
American distributor, alleging patent infringement under the Lanham
Act8 and appending four state law claims: breach of contract, conver-
I Brown v. Babbitt Ford, Inc., 571 P.2d 689, 696 (1977).
2 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § I, cl. 1, reads:
Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each state to the public Acts, Records, and
Judicial Proceedings of every other state.
3 Vespa of America Corp. v. Bajaj Auto Ltd., 550 F. Supp. 224, 227 (N.D. Cal. 1982).
4 While it is true that U.S. law extends over some conduct in other nations and encom-
passes foreign activities of aliens as well as U.S. citizens, at some point U.S. interests are too
weak and foreign interests too strong to justify extraterritorial assertion ofjurisdiction. A com-
ity test, originally developed by the Ninth Circuit to set the jurisdictional boundaries of U.S.
antitrust law, is useful in determining that point. See infra text accompanying notes 27-36.
In actual litigation, extraterritorial jurisdiction seldom has been found lacking. Up to May
1973, the Department of Justice filed some 248 foreign trade antitrust cases, and not one was
lost on jurisdictional grounds. W. FUGATE, FOREIGN COMMERCE AND THE ANTITRUST LAWS
(2d ed. 1973). Vespa is a private action, but reported dismissals on jurisdictional grounds are
infrequent in private actions as well. American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347
(1909), an early case casting doubt on the extraterritorial application of the Sherman Act, 15
U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1982), that is considered largely obsolete. See, e.g., United States v. Aluminum
Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945)(the "Alcoa" case).
5 Alcoa, 148 F.2d 416.
6 Id. (citing Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976)).
7 550 F. Supp. 224 (N.D. Cal. 1982).
8 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1974). For the Legislative History of the Lanham Act, see Act
of July 5, 1946, U.S. CODE CONG. SERVICE 1274; 1962 Pub. I,. No. 87-772, 1962 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 2844; 1974 Pub. L. No. 93-597, 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 7113.
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sion, unjust enrichment, and unfair competition. Under the doctrine of
pendent jurisdiction, state law claims for which there is no independent
federal jurisdiction may be appended to a substantial federal claim.9
The issue in Vespa centered upon whether pendent jurisdiction was an
appropriate basis for asserting U.S. authority over a related but wholly
foreign cause of action. 10 The court held that in this case, assertion of
U.S. jurisdiction over state and foreign law causes of action arising be-
tween two foreign corporations, surrounding overseas conduct, was
wholly inappropriate.II The decision furnishes an important judicial in-
terpretation of the role of comity in asserting U.S. jurisdiction over for-
eign conduct. Just as the notion of comity is addressed in direct
assertions of federal jurisdiction in antitrust and patent cases, it must
now be addressed in the context of pendent jurisdiction. As a procedural
consequence, the decision closes the loophole of which Vespa Corpora-
tion had taken advantage in appending its state law claims.
Vespa of America Corporation (Vespa) is the U.S. distributor of
Vespa vehicles, designed and manufactured by an Italian corporation,
Piaggio. In 1960, Piaggio licensed Bachraj Trading Corporation, an In-
dian corporation and Bajaj Auto Ltd's (Bajaj's) corporate predecessor, to
manufacture component parts and assemble both Vespa scooters and
three-wheeled commercial vehicles.' 2 Under Indian law, the Indian gov-
ernment maintained a high level of involvement in the licensing agree-
ment. 13 Piaggio and Bajaj executed or extended license agreements in
Plaintiffs in Vespa alleged jurisdiction under §§ 1121, 1125(a). "The district and territorial
courts of the United States shall have original jurisdiction and the court of appeals of the
United States shall have appellate jurisdiction of all actions arising under this chapter, without
regard to the amount in controversy or to diversity or lack of diversity of the citizenship of the
parties." Id. § 1121. For a discussion of the jurisdiction of the federal courts in trademark
infringement and unfair competition claims, see WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, JURISDICTION
§ 3582.
9 28 U.S.C. § 1338(b) provides that federal courts have original jurisdiction over claims
for unfair competition "when joined with a substantial and related claim under . . . the trade-
mark laws." This was originally a codification of the Hurn v. Oursler, 289 U.S. 238 (1938),
restrictive view of pendent jurisdiction, under which state law claims are appropriate for federal
court if they form a separate but parallel ground for relief also sought in a substantial claim
based on federal law. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966), broadened the
doctrine of pendent jurisdiction to include state and federal claims derived from a common
nucleus of operative facts that plaintiff would ordinarily try as a whole, and subsequent deci-
sions have updated the statutory interpretation to include Gibbs. See, e.g., Thompson Tool Co.
v. Rosenbaum, 443 F. Supp. 559 (D. Conn. 1977).
A majority of cases in which jurisdiction is pendent involve actions based on patent, copy-
right, and trademark law in which a nonfederal claim of unfair competition is joined with a
federal claim. See Annot., 5 A.L.R. 3d, 1040 (1966). The federal court's power to hear such
claims is derived from the notion that the relationship between the state and federal claims is
such that they comprise but one constitutional case. 550 F. Supp. at 227 (quoting Cibbs, 383
U.S. at 725).
10 550 F. Supp. at 227.
1 Id. at 230.
12 Id. at 225.
13 Id. at 226. The court citing as the government's rationale its need to safeguard and
promote Indian economic independence. Id
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1960, 1964, and 1968.14 Under the agreements, Bajaj received from
Piaggio all plans and specifications necessary to construct Vespa vehicles.
When the contract expired in 1971, however, Bajaj did not return the
plans and specifications and continued to manufacture the vehicles,
eventually becoming the world's second largest manufacturer of scoot-
ers-second only to Piaggio. As of 1982, the Indian manufacturer was
selling scooters in 171 countries and through its distributor, Vespa, had
sold approximately 1,300 scooters in the United States since its entry into
the American market in 1977.15
In 1980, nine years after the alleged breach of contract and after
Bajaj had achieved its current world-market status, the Italian patent
holder brought action against its Indian competitor to recover under the
Lanham Act 16 and under its appended state law claims. Piaggio claimed
that since 1971 Bajaj has manufactured scooters and three-wheeled vehi-
cles illegally. 7 In its answer, Bajaj contended that the 1968 licensing
agreement was executed with the express understanding that its rights to
produce the vehicles would survive the agreement.' 8 Piaggio conceded
that its claim under the Lanham Act extended only to those 1,300 vehi-
cles sold in the United States which directly affected interstate com-
merce. '9 Its pendent claims, however, sought damages resulting from the
sale of 800,000 vehicles world-wide which took place outside U.S. borders
and over which no overseas interference with international U.S. sales was
claimed. 20 The action came before the court on defendant's motion to
dismiss all of plaintiff's non-domestic claims.
By excluding from its Lanham Act cause of action claims for dam-
ages resulting from all transnational sales of vehicles, Piaggio successfully
avoided the application of comity principles in determining the existence
of jurisdiction under the Act. The court found, however, that this "tacti-
cal concession ' 2' did not eliminate the jurisdictional problems presented
in the complaint. In its discretion, the court declined to exercise pendent
jurisdiction over any of the wholly foreign-based claims raised in Piag-
gio's complaint, and granted defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiff's
breach of contract and conversion claims, as well as the extraterritorial
elements of the unfair competition and unjust enrichment claims. 2 2 The
court focused its analysis on three areas. First, it emphasized the growing
14 The record indicated that the first license was executed in 1960. It had to be rewritten
to include certain provisions required under Indian law, and was subsequently approved as
amended on March 22, 1961. In 1964, the Indian ministry approved an extension of the agree-
ment as requested by the parties. The litigation focused on the final agreement, approved by
the Indian government in 1968. Id.
15 Id. Bajaj does not market its three-wheeled vehicles in the United States. Id.
16 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a).
17 550 F. Supp. at 226.
18 id.
9 Id.
20 Id. at 230.
21 Id. at 226.
22 Id. at 225.
19841
N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. [VOL. 9
role of comity in determining U.S. jurisdiction over foreign conduct.
Second, it analyzed Vespa's complaint in light of a 1976 Ninth Circuit
decision, Timberlane Lumber Co. o. Bank of America, 23 in which the court
developed a comity test to determine jurisdiction in antitrust actions in-
volving foreign activities and foreign nationals. Third, the court dis-
cussed its own broad discretion to grant or deny pendent jurisdiction.
Regarding the role of comity in asserting U.S. jurisdiction over for-
eign conduct, the court reasoned that if principles of res judicata are to
ensure that decisions in one country will be effective and enforceable in
another, assertions of jurisdiction must be governed by respect for the
basic laws and policies of other countries. 24 Thus, absent constitutional
23 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976).
24 550 F. Supp. at 227. The court noted that the Restatement of Foreign Relations Law of
the United States suggests the following specific limitations on a court's jurisdiction to prescribe
and apply its law:
§ 403. Limitations on Jurisdiction to Prescribe
(1) Although one of the bases for jurisdiction under § 402 is present, a state
may not apply law to the conduct, relations, status, or interests of persons or
things having connections with another state or states when the exercise of such
jurisdiction is unreasonable.
(2) Whether the exercise ofjurisdiction is unreasonable is judged by evaluat-
ing all the relevant factors, including:
(a) the extent to which the activity (i) takes place within the regulating state,
or (ii) has substantial, direct, and foreseeable effect upon or in the regulating
state;
(b) the links, such as nationality, residence, or economic activity, between
the regulating state and the persons principally responsible for the activity to be
regulated, or between that state and those whom the law or regulation is designed
to protect;
(c) the character of the activity to be regulated, the importance of regulation
in the regulating state, the extent to which other states regulate such activities,
and the degree to which the desirability of such regulation is generally accepted;
(d) the existence of justified expectations that might be protected or hurt by
the regulation in question;
(e) the importance of regulation to the international political, legal or eco-
nomic system;
(f) the extent to which such regulation is consistent with the traditions of the
international system;
(g) the extent to which another state may have an interest in regulating the
activity;
(h) the likelihood of conflict with regulation by other states.
(3) An exercise of jurisdiction which is not unreasonable according to the
criteria indicated in Subsection (2) may nevertheless be unreasonable if it requires
a person to take action that would violate a regulation of another state which is
not unreasonable under those criteria. Preference between conflicting exercises of
jurisdiction is determined by evaluating the respective interests of the regulating
states in light of the factors listed in Subsection (2).
(4) Under the Law of the United States:
(a) a statute, regulation or rule is to be construed as exercising jurisdiction
and applying law only to the extent permissible under § 402 and this section,
unless such construction is not fairly possible; but
(b) where Congress has made clear its purpose to exercise jurisdiction which
may be beyond the limits permitted by international law, such exercise of juris-
diction, if within the constitutional authority of Congress, is effective as law in the
United States.
550 F. Supp. at 227-28 n.3 (quoting RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES § 402 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1981)).
Section 402 of the Restatement enumerates the following bases of jurisdiction:
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prohibition or a clear expression of congressional intent, the courts must
develop appropriate standards of restraint. 25 According to the court, the
Ninth Circuit developed such standards for antitrust cases in fimberlane,
and extended the criteria to extraterritorial application of the Lanham
Act in Wells Fargo Co. v. Wells Fargo Express Co .26 The criteria, according
to the court, are: some effect, actual or intended, on U.S. foreign com-
merce; an effect sufficiently large to present cognizable injury to plain-
tiffs; and an interest by the United States, in relation to the interest of
other countries, sufficiently strong to justify assertion of extraterritorial
authority.2 7 If these three criteria are met, the principle of comity is sat-
isfied to the extent that the United States may assert jurisdiction.
The Vespa court cited the third criterion, the strength of the interest
of the United States, as its main concern. To assess this strength, the
court further analyzed the facts in light of the Ninth Circuit's Timberlane
decision. In Tmberlane, the plaintiff alleged conspiracy under the Sher-
man Act 28 by certain foreign citizens and foreign corporations to inter-
fere with the exportation of Honduran lumber to the United States and
Puerto Rico. The defendants moved to dismiss, based upon the act of
state doctrine,2 9 under which the courts of one country will not sit in
judgment on the acts of the government of another done within its own
territory.30 The district court granted the motion and plaintiff appealed.
The circuit court found the application of the act of state doctrine
Subject to § 403, a state may, under international law, exercise jurisdiction
to prescribe and apply its law with respect to
(l)(a) conduct a substantial part of which takes place within its territory;
(b) the status of persons, or interests in things, present within its territory;
(c) conduct outside its territory which has or is intended to have substantial
effect within its territory;
(2) the conduct, status, interests or relations of its nationals outside its terri-
tory; or
(3) certain conduct outside its territory by persons not its nationals which is
directed against the security of the state or a certain state interest.
Id.
25 The court noted that it is ultimately the task of Congress to set the jurisdictional bound-
aries of a particular statute. See Alcoa, 148 F.2d 416 (cited at 550 F. Supp. at 228).
The tendency, however, seems to be for federal regulatory statutes to contain sweeping
jurisdictional language. For example, the Sherman Act reaches every contract in restraint of,
and every person who shall monopolize or attempt to monopolize, any part of trade or com-
merce among the several states or with foreign nations. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2. The comparable
jurisdictional grant in the Lanham Act is at 15 U.S.C. § 11 14(l)(a) and (b), and at § 1127.
26 556 F.2d 406 (9th Cir. 1977). See n/ia text accompanying notes 57-61.
27 550 F. Supp. at 228 (citing Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 613).
28 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2.
29 "Every sovereign state is bound to respect the independence of every other state, and
the courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the acts of the government of another done
within its own territory." Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897). See also American
Banana, 213 U.S. 347 (applying the act of state doctrine to a foreign trade antitrust case). The
leading modern statement of the act of state doctrine appears in Banco Nacional de Cuba v.
Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964), which concludes that the doctrine results not from interna-
tional or constitutional law, but derives from the judiciary's concern for a separation of powers
between it and the political branches of the government.
30 Underhill, 168 U.S. at 252.
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by the district court erroneous. On the other hand, it noted that the
Sherman Act does not limit its own reach, 3t nor does international law
define that point at which one country's interests are too weak to justify
the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction. Moreover, the circuit court
found the district court's reliance on a direct and substantial effect on
U.S. foreign commerce as a jurisdictional prerequisite to be misplaced. 32
"What we prefer," the Timberlane court concluded, "is an evaluation and
balancing of the relevant considerations in each case." The court called
such a balancing of interests a "jurisdictional rule of reason."' 33 It then
remanded the case to determine the relative interests of Honduras and
the United States.
The importance of the Timberlane decision to the Vespa court was the
ready-made framework 34 that the case provided for balancing compara-
tive interests between countries-the third criterion in the comity test,
and the Vespa court's main concern. The Vespa court read Timberlane as
creating a jurisdictional rule of reason based on six factors: first, the de-
gree to which assertion of U.S. jurisdiction would create conflict with
foreign law or policy; second, the principal places of business of the par-
ties; third, the extent to which enforcement could be expected to achieve
compliance; fourth, the relative significance of the effect of a decision on
the United States as compared with its effect elsewhere; fifth, the extent
to which there was an explicit purpose to harm or affect U.S. commerce
and the foreseeability of such effect; and last, the relative importance to
the violations charged of conduct within the United States as compared
with conduct abroad.3 5 The Vespa court analyzed Piaggio's claim in
terms of these factors, and found that: (1) any determination by the
United States of the Piaggio-Bajaj contract's validity and scope could
conflict with the Indian government's policy of promoting industrial in-
dependence; (2) Piaggio and Bajaj were both foreign-based corporations
and their U.S. distributors had only a tangential interest in the foreign
claims; (3) a judgment rendered in California against an Indian corpora-
tion under Indian law, or under California state law concepts of unfair
competition, ran a high risk of unenforceability; (4) the interest in the
litigation was necessarily greater in Italy and India, where both manu-
facturing and a large portion of the sales occur, than in the United
31 549 F.2d at 609. See supra note 25. "Although it may be 'evident from the text of the
antitrust statutes' that 'some . . .effect on our foreign commerce is a prerequisite to jurisdiction,'
• . . the statutory terms themselves are not precise or limited enough to provide additional
guidance to the courts." 549 F.2d at 609, n. 14 (emphasis in original) (quoting Occidental Petro-
leum Corp. v. Buttes Gas & Oil Co., 331 F. Supp. 92, 108-13 (C.D. Cal. 1971), afd, 461 F.2d
1261 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 950 (1972)).
32 549 F.2d at 609.
33 Id. See K. BREWSTER, ANTITRUST AND AMERICAN BUSINESS ABROAD 446 (1958). See
also W. FUGATE, FOREIGN COMMERCE & THE ANTITRUST LAWS (2d ed. 1973); Falk, Interna-
tionalJurididcton: Horizontal and Vertical Conceptions of Legal Order, 32 TEMP. L. Q. 295, 304-06
(1959).
34 550 F. Supp. at 229.
35 Id. at 229-30.
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States, into which the vehicles were exported; (5) the argument that
Bajaj intended or could have foreseen an impact on U.S. markets is tenu-
ous; and (6) Bajaj's domestic conduct was insignificant compared with its
conduct overseas.3 6 After a factor by factor analysis, the court concluded
that assertion of U.S. jurisdiction was inappropriate.
Finally, the Vespa court exercised its option to decline jurisdiction at
its own discretion. It declined on the grounds of judicial inefficiency,
inconvenience to the litigants, and jury confusion. The court noted that
allowing certain pendent claims to proceed in federal court may not al-
ways serve the goals which justify economy and convenience of the par-
ties.3 7 The court further noted that should Piaggio obtain a favorable
judgment, that judgment would likely breed more litigation in India,
where it must be enforced.38 The contract dispute arose over a decade
ago, and most accessible evidence and witnesses would be in India or
Italy.39 The court noted as well that jury confusion is likely'to result
from the disparity between Piaggio's pendent claim for damages result-
ing from the sale of 800,000 vehicles world-wide and its federal Lanham
Act claim which covered the sale of less than 2,000 scooters.40
Prior to Ti'mberlane, courts for the most part cited the effect on U.S.
foreign commerce to support extraterritorial jurisdiction. Judge Learned
Hand set the course when he declared, "Any state may impose liabilities
even upon persons not within its allegiance, for conduct outside its bor-
ders that has consequences within its borders which the state repre-
hends. ' '4 1 While foreign commentators have stated that this assertion
conflicts with comity and international law, 42 U.S. courts, nevertheless,
continued to apply the effects test as a prerequisite to jurisdiction in
Sherman Act cases without stating whether other factors were rele-
vant.4 3 44 Application of the effects test led courts to formulate such
36 Id.
37 Id. at 230. See Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726.
38 550 F. Supp. at 230.
39 Id.
40 Id.
41 Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 443.
42 See, e.g., Haight, Comment to Miller, 111 U. PA. L. REV. 117, 118-20 (1963); Ellis, Comment
to Miller, 11 U. PA. L. REV. 1129, 1129-32 (1963).
43 An assertion of jurisdiction based on internal consequences has been described as the
"objective territorial" principle of jurisdiction. See W. FUGATE, supra note 33, at 35-39.
44 See, e.g., United States v. R.P. Oldham Co., 152 F. Supp. 818, 822 (N.D. Cal. 1957)(the
existence of a direct and substantial effect satisfied jurisdictional requirements). See also RE-
STATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 18 (Tent. Draft No. 2,
1981), which reads in part:
A state has jurisdiction to prescribe a rule of law attaching legal consequences to
conduct that occurs outside its territory and causes an effect within its territory, if
either
(a) the conduct and its effect are generally recognized as consitituent ele-
ments of a crime or tort under the law of states that have reasonably developed
legal systems, or
(b)(i) the conduct and its effect are constituent elements of activity to which
the rule applies; (ii) the effect within the territory is substantial; (iii) it occurs as a
19841
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standards as: A direct and substantial effect on U.S. foreign commerce;45
an intention to affect imports and exports that actually has some effect
on them;46 a conspiracy which affects U.S. commerce; 4 7 a direct and in-
fluencing effect on trade; 48 and any effect that is not both insubstantial
and indirect. 49 Because most of the litigated cases have involved rela-
tively obvious offenses with clear and significant effects on foreign or in-
terstate commerce, the effects test has remained broad and is not widely
discussed within the cases themselves. As one commentator noted,
"Findings that an American effect was direct, substantial, and foresee-
able, or within the scope of congressional intent, have little independent
analytic significance. Instead, cases appear to turn on a reconciliation of
American and foreign interests in regulating their respective economies
and business affairs .. "50
The Timberlane court reasoned that the effects test by itself was in-
complete because it failed to consider the interests of other nations.
While the term "substantial" may be broadened by an individual court
to include comity and regard for the prerogatives of other nations, "it is
more likely they will be overlooked or slighted in interpreting past deci-
sions and reaching new ones."'' S The Thmberlane court noted that the sub-
stantial effects test may have been imported into foreign commerce
analysis from interstate antitrust analysis, where it is more appropriate. 52
In interstate antitrust analysis the substantial effects test helps to distin-
guish state burdens from federal burdens under the commerce clause.53
No comparable constitutional problem exists in defining the scope of
congressional power over foreign commerce. 54 The court also noted that
the act of state doctrine55 was inapplicable in private suits. Timberlane,
therefore, set down its jurisdictional rule of reason, which balanced the
competing interests of the countries involved, to govern the extraterrito-
rial reach of the Sherman Act.
direct and foreseeable result of the conduct outside the territory; and (iv) the rule
is not inconsistent with the principles ofjustice generally recognized by states that
have reasonably developed legal systems.
The "direct" and "substantial" requirements are contained in (b)(ii) and (iii).
45 See, e.g., Thomsen v. Cayser, 243 U.S. 66, 88 (1917) ("the combination affected the
foreign commerce of this country").
46 Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 444.
47 United States v. Imperial Chemical Industries, Ltd., 100 F. Supp. 504, 592 (S.D.N.Y.
1951).
48 United States v. Timkin Roller Bearing Co., 83 F. Supp. 284, 309 (N.D. Ohio 1949),
modified and a.f'd, 341 U.S. 593 (1951).
49 Occidental Petroleum v. Buttes Gas & Oil Co., 331 F. Supp. 92, 102-03 (C.D. Cal.
1971), affdon other grounds, 461 F.2d 1261 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 950 (1972).
50 Note, American Adjudication of Transnational Securities Fraud, 89 HARV. L. REV. 553, 563
(1976).
5' 549 F.2d 597, 612.
52 Id.
53 U.S. CONST. art. I § 8, cl. 3. "The Congress shall have power . . . to regulate Com-
merce with foreign Nations, and among the several States."
54 549 F.2d 597, 612.
55 See supra text accompanying note 29.
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A year later, the Ninth Circuit was faced with a similar case, this
time under the Lanham Trademark Act.56 In Wells Fargo Co. v. Wells
Fargo Express Co .,57 the owner of a registered trademark pertaining to the
words "Wells Fargo" brought an action against a Nevada corporation
and a Liechtenstein corporation for trademark infringement under the
Lanham Act and unfair competition abroad. Without benefit of the
Ninth Circuit's Timberlane decision, the district court held that it did not
have in personam jurisdiction over the foreign defendant, a Liechtenstein
corporation with U.S. subsidiaries. The court dismissed those portions of
the suit concerning activities in foreign countries for lack of subject mat-
ter jurisdiction. 58 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit held that the court may
be able to reach the defendant both as to its foreign and domestic activi-
ties, and that subject matter jurisdiction and a cause of action may exist
for the defendant's foreign activities under the Lanham Act. 59 The Fargo
court adopted the following language from Tmberlane as expressive of the
Ninth Circuit's jurisdictional rule of reason of comity and fairness:
The elements to be weighed include the degree of conflict with foreign
law or policy, the nationality or allegiance of the parties and the loca-
tions or principal places of business of corporations, the extent to which
enforcement by either state can be expected to achieve compliance, the
relative significance of effects on the United States as compared with
those elsewhere, the extent to which there is explicit purpose to harm or
affect American commerce, the foreseeability of such effect, and the rela-
tive importance to the violations charged of conduct within the United
States as compared with conduct abroad. A court evaluating these fac-
tors should identify the potential degree of conflict if American author-
ity is asserted. A difference in law or policy is one likely sore spot,
though one which may not always be present. Nationality is another;
though foreign governments may have some concern for the treatment
of American citizens and businesses residing there, they primarily care
about their own nationals. Having assessed the conflict, the court should
then determine whether, in the face of it, the contacts and the interests
of the United States are sufficient to support the exercise of extraterrito-
rial jurisdiction. 60
The Fargo court remanded the case for development of these additional
jurisdictional facts to be balanced under the Timberlane comity test. 6 1
In light of Timberlane and Fargo, the district court's refusal in Vespa
to assert jurisdiction over Piaggio's breach of contract and conversion
56 15 U.S.C. § 1051-1127 (1974). Seesupra note 8.
57 556 F.2d 406 (9th Cir. 1977).
58 Id. at 431. The court also based its decision on the doctrine of forum non conveniens,
the power of the court to decline jurisdiction if it appears that for the convenience of litigants
and witnesses and in the interests of justice, the action should have been instituted in another
forum where it might have been brought. See 28 U.S.C. § 1404.
In Vespa, defendant Bajaj raised the issue of forum non conveniens and the court ruled that
had the case not been dismissed on jurisdictional grounds it would have been appropriate to
decline under forum non conveniens, on the condition that Bajaj waive any statute of limita-
tions problems in a more convenient forum. 550 F. Supp. at 231.
59 556 F.2d at 431.
60 549 F.2d at 614-15.
61 556 F.2d at 431.
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claims, or over the extraterritorial aspects of Piaggio's unfair competition
and unjust enrichment claims, was not unexpected. Piaggio was aware
that the Timberlane comity test precluded federal jurisdiction under the
Lanham Act over its transnational claims. It therefore brought a single
cause of action extending only to the relatively small number of sales
which affected U.S. commerce. As the court noted, however, this conces-
sion did not cure the jurisdictional problems presented by appending
state and foreign law claims. 62 What the court scrutinized was Piaggio's
obvious attempt to circumvent Timberlane and Fargo by the use of pen-
dent jurisdiction. 63
The Vespa court emphasized that findings of jurisdiction turn on
balancing U.S. and foreign interests and regulating their respective com-
mercial activities. Foreseeable, direct, or substantial effects on U.S. com-
merce are no longer watchwords in determining jurisdiction, be it direct
assertions of federal jurisdiction in antitrust and patent cases, or pendent
jurisdiction of state and foreign law claims. The questions that remain
do not lessen the significance of the Vespa decision.
Because the result would be the same under either interpretation,
Vespa does not address whether the Timberlane analysis is a test for subject
matter jurisdiction, or a method for determining assertion of jurisdiction
once the presence of subject matter jurisdiction is assumed.64 Moreover,
the decision does not suggest what would happen if a plaintiff like Piag-
gio appended its independent state law claims to a federal claim more
substantial than that raised in Vespa. Presumably, the court would still
need to look closely at the third element of the Timberlane test 65 which
balances the interests of various nations in a dispute.
With Timberlane and Fargo, Vespa is part of a series of decisions
bringing the courts closer to a consensus on the limits of U.S. jurisdiction.
Significantly, Vespa applies the jurisdictional rule of reason in response to
essentially political concerns rather than economic or business considera-
tions. Judge Learned Hand wrote, "We should not impute to Congress
an intent to punish all whom its courts can catch."'66 In that spirit, the
Vespa court exercised jurisdictional forbearance in a transnational con-
text in response to comity and fairness rather than national power. In
doing so, the court did not isolate a single factor and make its existence
or nonexistence crucial, but made a total appraisal of the reasonableness
of the claim, taking into account any relevant facts.
The Vespa court exercised judicial restraint by applying the rule of
reason to pendent jurisdiction. By refusing to assert jurisdiction, the
court stated that the imposition of the risk of liability upon foreigners for
62 550 F. Supp. at 226.
63 Id.
64 Some courts have assumed the latter. See, e.g., Industrial Investment Development
Corp. v. Mitsui, 671 F.2d at 884-85 n.7 (cited at 550 F. Supp. at 227 n.2).
65 See supra text accompanying note 27.
66 Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 444.
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related, but purely foreign, conduct is subject to stringent limitations
which will not be increased or avoided by invoking the doctrine of pen-
dent jurisdiction.
-TRACY KENYON LISCHER

